Is Vedeno Gorge Awaiting Osama bin Laden? Ruslan Isayev, special to Prague Watchdog
Chechnya between the wars
After the end of the first Chechen war, the key Chechen armed forces were integrated into a National Guard, subordinated to Aslan Maskhadov. Groups with tight links to radical Islamic leaders concentrated in their hands virtually all law enforcement and security structures in Chechnya. Whole units in Grozny, Urus-Martan, Achkhoi-Martan and several other communities were formed by the so-called Wahhabists. Thanks to the influence of a number of individuals around Maskhadov who held radical Islamic views, the Chechen Ministry of Interior was even renamed the Ministry of Sharia State Security (MSSS). The head of MSSS was Islam Khalimov, a doctor of medicine, well-known for his close contacts with Islamic fundamentalist groups, which had had a great influence on the Chechen youth after the beginning of the war. Armed troops, which had fought together against the Russian army, were in fact divided into two rival factions. The first one was based on the National Guard and observed traditional Islam; the second one was formed by Wahhabite groups. In June 1998 the factions clashed openly. In Gudermes, the second largest city in Chechnya, a common dispute between armed groups escalated into a real battle. For four days brutal warfare was waged between the guardians, led by S. Yamadayev (he would later betray Maskhadov and surrender Gudermes without a fight), and the so-called Jamaat groups, led by emirs Abdurahman and Abdulmalik. Abdurahman had been a spiritual leader of the emerging Wahhabi units and Abdulmalik was a field commander, in charge of the Kurchaloy Jamaat. Shamil Basayev and Khattab did not participate in the conflict. Successful negotiations with both parties were led by the vice-premier Vakha Arsanov. This was rather understandable as it later became clear that Vakha Arsanov sympathized with radical Islamists as he needed their support to sustain power after falling out with Maskhadov. The National Guard stopped fighting following Maskhadov’s order. He also promised to identify and punish the culprits. In a short time indeed, the Chechen President signed a special decree and pronounced eight clerical officials personae non gratae. Those eight men came from the Near East and had in fact been propagators of fundamentalism in Chechnya. Brigadier generals Abdulmalik and Arbi Barayev, a commander of the Islamic regiment for special tasks, were demoted. The captured soldiers of the National Guard regiment in Gudermes were later set free by Shamil Basayev. Basayev personally met Arbi Barayev and talked him into this “humane decision.” The conflict seemed settled but both sides were hanging on for a new, much bigger conflict. This was thwarted by the second Chechen war, which reconciled their hostilities in the face of a common enemy. After the conflict in Gudermes, Shamil Basayev proposed creating a so-called Islamic Peace Battalion (IPB). The IPB was formed by Basayev and Khattab troops, who were joined by the Akhmadov brothers from Urus-Martan. This armed group invaded Dagestan in 1999 to “help their Muslim brothers” of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi. Chechen fighters and Arab mercenaries From the outset it must be said that the role of Arab volunteers, or “Arab mercenaries” as they are called by the Russian media, has always been overstated by Russian generals and politicians. First of all, to be a mercenary you need someone to hire you, which is absolutely unheard of in the present conditions in Chechnya. Maskhadov has never had the money to do it. Besides, the Chechens themselves, once they had arms, were ready to fight the Russian army without any salaries or bribes. The Chechens went to the war voluntarily, no general mobilization was needed, nor was it necessary to close the Chechen borders to lower the number of deserters. The Chechen fighters were never paid and have been operating autonomously and voluntarily. They were and are subordinated to the general staff quite freely and that is why the Russian authorities can say that Maskhadov does not fully control the armed forces. The Chechens have fought in a very unusual way and this might be the secret of their success. Paramilitary, badly armed troops have been facing the militarily superior Russian army for five years and are still meeting their obligation not to allow the enemy to control the Chechen territories. The Russian military command in Chechnya and the pro-Russian Chechen administration admit that they have not been able to control the situation in the republic, especially during the night. Contacts with Afghanistan If we ignore the moral aspect, contact with Afghanistan has been episodic and there has been no strong groundwork. In 1993, a group of some 20 people led by Basayev visited Afghanistan. The purpose of their mission is unknown but Basayev allegedly wanted to train his fighters in Afghan military camps. It is however well known that Basayev’s troops got poisoned by some chemical substance there and returned quickly to Chechnya. After the first war in Chechnya, the minister of foreign affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Movladi Udugov, tried to foster diplomatic contact with the Taliban government. His deputy, Yaragi Abdullayev, visited Kabul on a special mission. Udugov needed all the diplomatic success he could get, preferably direct recognition or at least diplomatic talks about the recognition of Chechnya as an independent republic. At many press conferences Udugov has demonstrated his successful diplomacy stressing the fact that Grozny had been accepted to an association of Islam capitals. He, however, omitted to point out that Makhachkala, the capital of neighbouring Dagestan, which is a part of the Russian Federation and is not striving for independence, also became a member of the association. Udugov was soon dismissed from his post by Maskhadov and the Afghan files seemed to be closed. The Taliban later recognized Chechnya, after the beginning of massive bombing of the Chechen territory by the Russian forces, which became public after the visit by the Chechen ex-president, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, to Kabul. And this is all. Chechnya has never received any military help from the Taliban. The weapons that the Chechens fight with have all been produced in Russia. Over 50 people from Arab countries are currently fighting together with the Chechen troops. The number is approximate, because the foreign volunteers have never been counted. Chechnya is a small republic. In fact, not much can be hidden. An Arab in the street would not go unnoticed by local residents. Journalists several times visited Khattab’s camps by the Khulkhulau river in the entry to the Vedeno gorge. There they met some Arabs working as teachers of Arabic and the basics of Islam. The combat issues were taught by Chechens who were at that time equally experienced as fighters as the Arabs who had fought in the Afghan war. Who is the Afghan link? Fighters living for month after month in the mountains, sleeping every night in the open air, know nothing about the connections of their commanders. Among all the famous commanders and political figures in Chechnya, only Aslan Maskhadov, Shamil Basayev, Vakha Arsanov, Ruslan Gelayev or emir Khattab could theoretically have some contact with bin Laden. Maskhadov, despite his introduction of Sharia law in Chechnya, is a rather secular man and would never agree, even if being well paid, to become a vassal of bin Laden or anybody else. Shamil Basayev has never had significant financial resources and his troops, according to recent news, are now experiencing very hard times. He might have had some phone calls with representatives of Islamic organizations of the Near East, but these had no impact on the situation in Chechnya. The main suspect is Khattab but not even he has ever negotiated with bin Laden, as his close collaborators affirm. Khattab has certainly received some financial support for the “jihad” in Chechnya, but the finances came from other sources. We must also keep in mind that Khattab comes from a rich family and before coming to Chechnya he had fought Russians in Afghanistan. At least, this is what the fighters from the “Kavkaz” training camp, established by Khattab, believe. Ironically enough, Maskhadov once issued a decree ordering the closure of Khattab’s camp, but the war started before the decree came into effect. Vakha Arsanov has been out of public life and lives at a base in the mountains somewhere in southern Chechnya. Another important person in the military-political hierarchy of Ichkeria is Ruslan Gelayev. He visited Pakistan in 1998, where he studied Islam. He returned to Chechnya at the time of the TV conflict between Maskhadov and the representatives of so-called Islamic Shura – the higher executive organ set up on Basayev’s initiative when Maskhadov introduced “total” Sharia rule in February 1999. Having mentioned the introduction of the Sharia rule, it must be regarded as one of Maskhadov’s greatest misjudgments. He thought he would weaken the position of Basayev and his guerillas when taking the initiative to introduce the Sharia rule, but in the end the opposite happened. Maskhadov signed a judgement on himself: There was no place for a president in an Islamic republic and Maskhadov was asked to resign. After his return from Pakistan, Ruslan Gelayev unexpectedly stood by Maskhadov and received the office of vice-premier. Even the former mufti and current head of the pro-Moscow Chechen administration, Ahmad Kadyrov, has indicated that Gelayev might be the person with whom to negotiate the end of war. Although his speeches have been full of Islamic rhetoric, Gelayev is a rather secular man and scarcely had anything common with the Saudi billionaire or other Islamic world leaders who hold fundamentalist views. The Chechen armed forces receive help from tens of Islamic organizations and many individuals. Among these may be some who are in one way or another connected to bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. One of Maskhadov’s friends and close aides, former minister of education Khozh-Ahmed Yarikhanov, however denies that either Maskhadov or any other Chechen representative have ever had talks with Osama bin Laden. Maskhadov once visited Saudi Arabia and met with the king, but did not pursue contacts with other leaders of the Arab countries. On the contrary, in autumn 1999, he sent a letter to the Pope and asked him to pressurize the Russian authorities into stopping the war. Yarikhanov also declares that the Chechen leadership is ready to terminate contact with any organization labeled as terrorist by the US authorities. According to his statement, this is no problem for Chechnya because the whole world knows very well the organizations which Maskhadov and the Chechen authorities cooperate with: the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Red Cross, and other humanitarian and human rights organizations that received Moscow’s approval to operate within the territory of the conflict. Ordinary Chechens do not believe the Russian politicians and military commanders who declare that they have evidence about contacts between the Chechen field commanders and Osama bin Laden. Similar statements are widely regarded as Russian propaganda addressed mostly to America. Russian assertions that Osama bin Laden could be hiding on the territory of Chechnya and explicit efforts to identify Chechens with international terrorists are perceived as ridiculous and absolute nonsense. RELATED ARTICLES:
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