Even the Tiny Rubicon May Be More Important than the Mighty Tibere (Part1)By Vazha Mtavrishvili, special to Prague Watchdog
What are the options for resolving the Chechen issue? Well, there is a war, so the resolution of the issue could be to make peace. But this particular war started just after the Khasav-Yurt peace agreement. It was clear right from the beginning that this was a truce rather than a permanent peace. To date Russia has not concluded a single peace agreement in the Caucasus, which was not simply a stop-gap agreement until it continued its aggression. The Georgiev Treaty of 1783 in which Russia recognised and guaranteed Georgia’s sovereignty ended in 1801 with the Russian empire occupying not only Georgia, but also the whole of the Caucasus. The Peace Agreement of May 7, 1920 concluded between Georgia and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in which Russia also recognised de jure Georgia’s sovereignty ended with Russia immediately annexing Azerbaijan and Armenia. A joint attack on Georgia with the Turks was undertaken already in February 1921. Russia has even interfered extensively in the internal affairs of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia – countries whose sovereignty has been recognised not only de facto, but also de jure. The whole world, by failing to recognise the Chechen Republic, signalled that Chechnya is an internal Russian matter and that nobody is permitted to interfere. In the Khasav-Yurt peace agreement, Russia recognised de facto the independence of the Chechen Republic. However, it did not recognise its independence de jure and thus could not guarantee peace in Chechnya. Under these conditions, with no stable peace and the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic unrecognised, it was clear right from the beginning that the naive acknowledgement by Western counties of the good will of Russia to restore the Chechen Republic could only serve to undermine Chechnya from inside and to establish more favourable conditions for Russia to invade Chechnya for the second time. And the trigger for the invasion was Basayev’s attack on Dagestan financed by Russia. Putin blames Maskhadov for not curbing Basayev and Khatab. But when we know that Russia was getting ready for the second invasion into Chechnya and Maskhadov already before the war started to sound an alarm about it, the following question arises: how could Maskhadov have prevented the invasion? Let’s say, that he could have arrested Basayev and Khatab, but how could have he prevented the explosions in Moscow? He could have done that only if he had rushed to Moscow and placed patrols on every single building to prevent the Federal Security Service (FSB) from planting the explosions. In the end, there are some 600,000 Chechens in Russia and if any of them plot an act of terrorism, it is the responsibility of Putin, not Maskhadov, as these Chechens are citizens of Russia or refugees falling under Putin’s jurisdiction, not Maskhadov’s. Was it Maskhadov who declared war on Russia and was thus responsible for Basayev and Khatab invading Dagestan? Russia could, if willing, close the borders and not allow them to return to Chechnya. And if federal forces could not do that or were not willing to do it, how can we claim it is the responsibility of Maskhadov, the leader of a sovereign country? We need to keep in mind, that Basayev was, no doubt, greatly influenced by Jokhar Dudayev who was also willing to come to an agreement with Moscow, but Dudayev, let us remember, was killed when negotiations had just begun. He spoke over the phone with a member of the State Duma of the Russian Federation when two missiles capable of destroying a cruiser were launched locked on to the signal of his telephone. Russia, forgetting about the presumption of innocence, declares that Maskhadov is a criminal and a prosecutor is the only person with whom he may talk. But wasn’t it Maskhadov, the moderate candidate for the office of President of Chechnya, who was preferred by Moscow and isn’t it Putin who seeks an alternative to Maskhadov in the jails of Moscow among convicted Chechen criminals? If we are to ask what kind of Chechnya Moscow would like see, there is an open-ended answer – obedient. And it is an open-ended answer as Moscow needs the obedience of Chechnya not only to keep it within the Russian Federation, but also so that this obedient Chechnya attacks its neighbours and participate in military provocations organised by the Kremlin when Moscow requests it to do so. We must remember that Basayev attacked not only Dagestan, but also Georgia in 1992, at the precise moment when Georgia became a sovereign country and Chechnya remained an obedient part of the Russian Federation. So, if Putin seeks the truth, he should apologise to Boris Nikolayevich for making him rash promises and arrest him for armed invasion of his obedient subject Basayev in a neighbouring sovereign country. Russia needed Armenians and Azerbaijanis to fight each other and wanted itself to become a peacemaker in this conflict. Russia also wanted the Georgians to fight not only with Abkhazians and Ossetians, but also among themselves in a civil war, with Moscow regulating and controlling these processes for its own benefit. And if anybody believes that sovereign Georgia and Azerbaijan could not think of anything better for their independence but to elect as presidents former members of the Politburo of the Soviet Union, Shevardnadze and Aliyev, they are grossly mistaken. Both Russia and the West wanted it. And if anybody believes that the South Caucasian countries hoped to be sovereign with they borders guarded by Russian border guards, then they are naive. And if anybody thinks that these countries broke free from the USSR to become voluntarily members of the CIS, that is also naivety. (to be continued)
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