(Following is a report on Chechnya that will be discussed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe during its spring 2003 part-session. PW editors).
Summary
The Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights believes that there cannot be peace without justice
in the Chechen Republic. The human rights situation in the Republic is the key
to an equitable political solution based on national reconciliation.
The human rights situation in
the Chechen Republic is characterised by gross human rights abuses, violations
of international humanitarian law and war crimes, committed by both sides to
the conflict. So far, everyone involved – the Russian government,
administration and judicial system, the different Chechen regimes – has
failed dismally to provide adequate protection from human rights abuses. Even
the influence and co-operation of international organisations and their member
states have not managed to ensure that the victims of these abuses were
granted redress, nationally or internationally. The result is a climate of
impunity which encourages further human rights violations and which denies
justice to thousands of victims.
If a meaningful political
process is to develop in the Republic, human rights violations must stop and
those responsible for past abuses must be brought to justice. The Assembly
should thus recommend that a variety of measures be taken by the relevant
actors in the Chechen Republic, the Russian Federation and the international
community to improve the human rights situation in the Chechen Republic
without further delay.
I.
Draft resolution
1.
The Parliamentary Assembly recalls its previous resolutions and
recommendations on the conflict in the Chechen Republic. It makes particular
reference to Resolution 1315
(2003) on the evaluation of the prospects for a political solution of the
conflict in the Chechen Republic, which remains fully valid.
2.
The Assembly reiterates its belief that there cannot be peace without justice
in the Chechen Republic. The human rights situation in the Republic is the key
to an equitable political solution based on national reconciliation. Without a
tangible improvement of the human rights situation, all attempts at pacifying
the region are doomed to failure.
3.
For nearly a decade now, people in the Chechen Republic have lived in constant
fear. Their towns and villages have been reduced to rubble, their fields
mined, their friends and relatives murdered, illegally detained, “disappeared”,
kidnapped, raped, tortured and robbed. The Assembly has consistently condemned
the gross human rights abuses, the violations of international humanitarian
law and the war crimes committed in Chechnya by both sides to the conflict.
Since the very beginning of the first conflict in Chechnya in 1994, the
Assembly has called for those responsible for these acts to be brought to
justice – to little avail.
4.
The people of the Chechen Republic have a right not just to our pity but also
to our protection. So far, everyone involved – the Russian government,
administration and judicial system, the different Chechen regimes – has
failed dismally to provide such protection from human rights abuses.
International organisations and their member states have not managed to ensure
that the victims of these abuses were granted redress, nationally or
internationally.
5.
The main reason why both Russian soldiers and Chechen fighters go on
committing these abuses to this day is that they nearly always get away with
them. Due to the restrictive policy of access to the Chechen Republic
instituted by the Russian government, both for NGOs and for the press, most
violations would never even come to light were it not for the courage and
tireless efforts of some brave victims, journalists and human rights
activists. Criminal investigations of gross violations by Russian forces and
Chechen fighters – even of massacres of innocent Chechen civilians and
targeted assassinations of local heads of administrations or their families
– are nevertheless few and far between, depressingly ineffective and mostly
fail to secure convictions in court (if they reach that stage, which is rare).
6.
Non-judicial redress mechanisms set up by the Russian authorities, such as the
Office of the Special Representative of the President of the Russian
Federation on Human Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic, do little
more than catalogue individual complaints. While the Assembly pays tribute to
the courage of the Council of Europe experts working within that Office, it
asks that all measures be taken to increase the effectiveness of their current
mandate as regards their possibility of influencing the human rights
situation.
7.
The mandate of the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya has not been renewed by
the Russian government. The Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention
of Torture (CPT) has complained of Russia’s lack of co-operation with it.
Russia has yet to authorise the publication of its reports. The
recommendations of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights are
implemented by Russia with long delays, if at all. The European Court of Human
Rights, set up to deal with individual violations of human rights, cannot hope
to cope effectively with systematic human rights abuse of the Chechen scale
via individual complaints. Lamentably, no member state or group of member
states has yet found the courage to lodge an interstate complaint with the
Court.
8.
The result is a climate of impunity which encourages further human rights
violations and which denies justice to the thousands of victims, embittering
the population to a point where the Chechen Republic could truly become
ungovernable. If a meaningful political process is to develop in the Republic,
human rights violations must stop and those guilty of past abuses must be
brought to justice.
9.
To ensure that human rights are respected in the Chechen Republic in the
future, the Assembly recommends that:
i.
Chechen fighters should immediately stop their terrorist activities and
renounce all forms of crime. Any kind of support for Chechen fighters should
cease immediately;
ii.
Russian forces be better controlled and discipline enforced: all relevant
military and civilian regulations, constitutional guarantees and
international and humanitarian law, particularly the Geneva Conventions and
the protocols thereto, should be fully respected during all operations,
including full co-operation with the prokuratura before, during and
after such operations;
iii.
in so far as the security situation allows, troops should be confined to
their barracks or withdrawn from the Chechen Republic altogether;
iv.
those members of Russian forces suspected of committing abuses be fully
investigated and, if found guilty, severely punished in accordance with the
law, regardless of their rank and position;
v.
the recommendations of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights
should be implemented immediately by the Russian Federation.
10.
To ensure that those guilty of abuses be brought to justice, the Assembly:
i.
demands better co-operation from the Russian authorities with national and
international mechanisms of redress, both judicial and non-judicial;
ii.
calls on member states of the Council of Europe to pursue all avenues of
accountability with regard to the Russian Federation without further delay,
including interstate complaints before the European Court of Human Rights
and the exercise of universal jurisdiction for the most serious crimes
committed in the Chechen Republic;
iii.
considers that, if the efforts to bring to justice those guilty of human
rights abuses are not intensified, and the climate of impunity in the
Chechen Republic prevails, the international community should consider
setting up an ad hoc tribunal to try war crimes and crimes against
humanity in the Chechen Republic, modelled on the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, to be empowered to try all such crimes
committed in the Chechen Republic;
iv.
urges Russia to ratify the Statute of the International Criminal Court
without delay.
II.
Draft recommendation
1.
The Assembly refers to its Resolution … (2003) on the human rights situation
in the Chechen Republic. It reiterates its belief that there will be no peace
without justice in Chechnya.
2.
The Assembly believes that urgent action is necessary to counteract the
climate of impunity which has developed in the Chechen Republic over the last
decade. Those guilty of past human rights abuses committed by both sides to
the conflict must be brought to justice without further delay, and further
human rights violations must be actively prevented.
3.
Considering that the efforts undertaken so far by all actors involved,
starting with the Russian government, administration and judicial system, but
also by the Council of Europe and its member states, have failed dismally to
improve the human rights situation and to ensure that past human rights
violations and particularly war crimes are adequately prosecuted, the Assembly
recommends that the Committee of Ministers:
i.
reorient its assistance programmes in the North Caucasus towards an
amelioration of the human rights situation in the Chechen Republic as the
priority objective, and allocate sufficient funds to these programmes to
make a real difference;
ii.
ensure that non-governmental organisations active in preventing and
documenting human rights violations in the Chechen Republic, as well as
those assisting their victims in different ways, are involved in the said
assistance programmes;
iii.
urge the Russian government to fully comply with the recommendations
addressed to it in paragraphs 9 and 10 of Resolution … (2003) on the human
rights situation in the Chechen Republic;
iv.
if the efforts to bring to justice those guilty of human rights abuses are
not intensified, and the climate of impunity in the Chechen Republic
prevails, consider proposing to the international community the setting up
of an ad hoc tribunal to try war crimes and crimes against humanity
in the Chechen Republic, modelled on the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, to be empowered to try all such crimes
committed in the Chechen Republic.
III.
Draft order
1.
The Assembly refers to its Resolution … (2003) and Recommendation … (2003)
on the human rights situation in the Chechen Republic.
2.
The Assembly instructs its Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to
report back to it at its September 2003 part-session on the implementation of
these texts and also on the recommendations of the Council of Europe
Commissioner for Human Rights.
IV.
Explanatory memorandum
by Mr Bindig, Rapporteur
A.
Introduction
1.
This report is based on Order
584 (2003), in which the Assembly instructed this Committee to present to
it, at its next part-session, a report on the human rights situation in the
Chechen Republic. In accordance with the Order, this report is based on
information made available by the competent authorities, international
organisations, NGOs and journalists. I would like to thank everyone who shared
information with me, but I would like to single out Human Rights Watch,
Memorial, the Chechnya Justice Initiative and Amnesty International for their
especially valuable assistance.
2.
I have had very little time to
prepare this report – less than four weeks, in fact. Mr Sultygov, the
Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation, has
compiled information for me, which was received in Russian by Mr Haller,
Secretary General to the Assembly, on 3 March 2003[1]
(and is currently being translated). I have not yet received the list the
Assembly requested of the Russian authorities in Resolution
1315 (2003)[2].
Needless to say, this information is crucial to a balanced report on the human
rights situation in the Chechen Republic. I thus propose that any information
of value which has not been received in time be included and evaluated in an
addendum to this report, to be considered by the Committee on the first day of
the April part-session. Should this information make amendments to the draft
resolution and the draft recommendation necessary, the Committee could
consider these at the same time, and table them in the name of the Committee.
3.
In this report, I will concentrate on
the current human rights situation in Chechnya, i.e. I will in principle not
deal with violations that predate the current conflict (which started in
autumn 1999). This is not to say that the human rights situation in Chechnya
was unproblematic beforehand: indeed, grave human rights abuses have been
committed by both sides since the first conflict began in winter 1994[3],
many say even earlier, since Dzokhar Dudaev came to power in Chechnya in 1991.
However, even a “truth and reconciliation commission” – for which the
time is not yet ripe - would probably find it difficult to chronicle all that
suffering; “just” dealing with three-and-a-half years of human rights
violations is daunting enough a task.
4.
I will start this report with those
human rights violations which are generally attributed to Russian forces,
before going into those abuses generally attributed to Chechen fighters. The
violations attributed to Russian forces are often better documented
(especially by NGOs) than those attributed to Chechen fighters, and are thus
examined here in greater detail. This does not mean that the crimes committed
by Chechen fighters are any less gruesome than those committed by Russian
forces – on the contrary. (In any case, for the victim, the identity of the
perpetrator makes no difference to his or her suffering.) However, the scale
of the human rights abuses perpetrated by both sides does seem to differ, a
fact that could be explained either by numbers – there are over 80.000
Russian troops stationed in the Republic, in contrast to an estimated number
of 1.500 Chechen fighters remaining – or by other factors, such as fear of
reprisals. Following this in-depth analysis, which will also treat individual
cases of particular concern in accordance with my mandate as defined by Order
No. 584 (2003), I will then try to draw the appropriate conclusions from
the information currently at my disposal, and make a few constructive
recommendations.
B.
Human rights violations attributed to Russian forces
General statistical
analysis
5.
Over the last three years, the Russian
authorities have made quite a lot of statistical information available to the
Assembly and/or its Joint Working Group on Chechnya about human rights
violations in the Chechen Republic, their investigation and prosecution. The
information has been of varying quality and detail, and sometimes
contradictory, but I will nevertheless attempt to analyse the most important
and recent data.
6.
The latest information on criminal cases
instigated by the prosecutor’s office concerning crimes committed against
the civilian population in the Chechen Republic was provided to the Assembly
by the Russian authorities on 17 January 2003[4].
According to this document, since the beginning of the “counterterrorist
operation” military prosecutors instigated 162 cases, 97 of which were
closed (nearly 60%), 57 – referred to military courts (35%). No information
on the nature of these cases (which concern military servicemen only) was
provided, nor on the number of convictions, the length of sentences, etc[5].
7.
The same document also listed the number
of cases instigated by the civilian prosecutor’s office on crimes committed
in 2002 by members of police and special forces against the civilian
population (77 cases, of which 37 suspended and 7 referred to court).
For military prosecutors, the numbers for 2002 were 44 cases instigated (of
which 15 cases closed, 4 suspended and 18 referred to military courts). There
does not seem to be much difference in the efficiency of the military and
civilian prosecuting authorities in view of these numbers.
8.
In January 2001, the Assembly
asked to be provided with a detailed list and the current status of all
criminal investigations by military and civilian prosecutors into crimes
against the civilian population committed by servicemen and members of special
police forces in the Chechen Republic before the April 2001 part-session. This
list was received in time, and made available to the Bureau and the Joint
Working Group on Chechnya (JWG).
9.
However, an analysis of the list
revealed that most investigations had not led to tangible results. Few cases
made it to trial; most were suspended, transferred, or dismissed. The NGO “Human
Rights Watch” conducted a detailed analysis of this list[6],
concluding that more than 50% of all opened investigations had been suspended
(and 79% of all investigations into “disappearances”). 12% of the criminal
cases opened by the Military Procuracy concerned driving accidents. At that
time, only 3% of all the listed cases had been transferred to the courts.
10.
Updates to the list were provided only
on a piece-meal basis; the Assembly is still waiting for a detailed updated
list as requested in Resolution
No. 1270 (2002) and again in Resolution
No. 1315 (2003). Until such a list is received, the Assembly will have to
assume that the current breakdown of cases is similar to that in April 2001;
this means that it is quite possible that even some of the 57 cases
investigated by the military prosecutors’ office in the last three years
which did reach the courts might have been concerned with traffic accidents
and the like.
11.
One fact stands out in all the
prosecution statistics listed above: the small number of criminal cases
instigated, and the even smaller number of those transferred to the courts.
The numbers provided by the Russian authorities, that only 121 crimes against
the civilian population were committed by Russian forces, and only 311 by
Chechen fighters, seem very low for an active war-zone during the whole year
of 2002. In contrast, the Office of the Special Representative Mr Sultygov has
received 1.085 applications on criminal cases, and 1.568 applications on
abduction cases for the period of 1 January 2000 to 1 November 2002 alone,
with the majority of people disappearing in Grozny, the surrounding district,
and the Shali district[7]. The
numbers of both criminal and abduction cases have steadily increased in nearly
all districts.
12.
NGOs have documented even more crimes
against the civilian population which, it thus seems, are inefficiently
investigated by the prosecuting authorities or not at all. To be fair, the
work of prosecutors on the ground is difficult: prosecutors risk being
kidnapped or murdered while doing their duty, and their efforts are hampered
by the lack of co-operation of the armed forces – for example, Order No. 80
by General Moltenskoi[8] is
regularly flouted, and no detailed records of special operations and the
location and activities of military vehicles seem to be kept and/or made
available to the prosecuting authorities. No wonder that a climate of impunity
reigns in the Chechen Republic. I will now present some brief examples of the
types of crimes which go unpunished:
Mass killings
13.
Russian forces are alleged to have
committed at least four mass killings of civilians in the course of the
current conflict: three of them in the course of the “hot” phase (in
Alkhan-Yurt in December 1999, in Staropromyslovsky in December 1999/January
2000, and in Novy Aldy in February 2000) and one of them after large-scale
military operations had already ceased: in Mesker-Yurt in late May 2002. I
will briefly examine each of these cases.
Alkhan-Yurt
14.
On 1 December 1999, after weeks of heavy
fighting, Russian forces took control of Alkhan-Yurt, a village located just
south of Grozny. According to a report by the NGO “Human Rights Watch” of
April 2000[9], “during the two
weeks that followed, Russian forces went on a rampage in the village,
summarily executing at least 14 civilians. They first expelled, temporarily,
hundreds of civilians from Alkhan-Yurt, and then began systematically looting
and burning the village, killing anyone in their way”.
15.
According to the report, the last of the
civilians to die, Aindi Altimirov, was killed and beheaded by Russia soldiers
on 18 December 1999. On 17 December 1999, Russia’s then highest ranking
representative for Chechnya, Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Koshman, and Malik
Saidulayev, a prominent pro-Moscow Chechen leader, travelled to Alkhan-Yurt,
to investigate allegations of serious abuses by Russian forces in this,
Saidulayev’s, home village. Much of the visit was filmed, and shows the two
walking around the devastated village, discovering several caches of goods
looted by Russian soldiers, and even being threatened with being shot
themselves by some (apparently intoxicated) soldiers. The subsequent criminal
investigation has reportedly been closed “for lack of evidence of a crime”.
No further information has been made available to the Assembly on this case,
despite several requests of the past years.
Staropromyslovsky district
of Grozny
16.
The mass murder of civilians in the
Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny took place over several weeks in the
context of the fight over Grozny between late December 1999 and mid-January
2000. On 7 February 2000, the NGO “Human Rights Watch” chronicled the
unlawful killing of 38 civilians in total, claiming that most of the victims
were women and elderly men, apparently shot by Russian soldiers at close range[10].
According to the same NGO, the body-count has risen to 70 in the meantime.
17.
Unfortunately, it is impossible for me
to go into all these 70 summary executions within the framework of this
report. However, the relatives of several of the deceased have lodged
applications with the European Court of Human Rights, two of which were
declared admissible on 19 December 2002. The cases in question are those of
the applicants M. A. Khashiev and R. A. Akaev, concerning the deaths of five
of their relatives. In the words of the Malgobek City Court’s decision of 7
April 2000, which was, however, later repealed, “on January 17, 2000,
Russian soldiers – the 205th battalion – entered in
Staoproyslovskii district of Grozny, where his [Magomed Khashiev’s]
relatives resided. These troops committed outrages. On January 19, 2000,
soldiers of this battalion entered the courtyard of his brother and sister,
and brutally murdered his brother, Khamid, his sister, Lida, and her two sons,
Anzor and Rizvan.”[11]
18.
The investigation of these killings, as
of the other killings in this district, has been slow, incomplete and
confusing. Even though on 10 February 2000, relatives of the deceased
brought the mutilated bodies of Magomed Goigov, Khamid Khashiev and Rizvan
Taimeskhanov to prosecutors in Ingushetia, and forensic experts examined the
bodies, and subsequently Ingush prosecutors interviewed relatives of the
families about the circumstances in which the bodies had been found, the
Grozny prosecutors’ office did not instigate criminal proceedings until 3
May 2000. According to information put at my disposal by the Prosecutor’s
Office of the Chechen Republic on 16 January 2001[12],
the grounds for opening the case “was the publication of the article “Freedom
or Death” in the newspaper “Novaya Gazeta” No. 12, dated 27 April 2000”.
In accordance with the same document, the bodies of murdered local residents
were discovered only in February 2000, and the operational investigation found
no eyewitnesses to the murders by members of the Russian armed forces[13].
19.
On 17 January 2003, the Russian
authorities provided the following information on the “current results of
the investigations concerning the alleged massacres of civilians”: “On May
3, 2000, a criminal case (No. 12038) was instigated on the fact of discovery
of corpses of the civilians in Novy Katayama of the Staropromyslovsky district
of Grozny. 28 witness were interrogated. On November 10, 2002 preliminary
investigation was suspended because the persons who had committed the crime
were not identified. At present the investigation of the case was resumed and
is under investigation.”
Novye Aldi
20.
On 5 February 2000, in the course of a
large-scale “sweep operation”, Russian forces summarily executed at least
sixty civilians in Aldi and Chernorechie, suburbs of Grozny. The NGO “Human
Rights Watch” published a report on the incident in June 2000[14],
which very clearly chronicles the killings by Russian riot police (OMON) and
contract soldiers – they included a one-year-old boy and an eight-month
pregnant woman. According to information put at my disposal by the Prosecutor’s
Office of the Chechen Republic on 16 January 2001[15],
a criminal case was instigated by the Grozny Prosecutor’s Office on 5 March
2000. “In the course of investigations it was established that during the
day of 5 February 2000, unknown persons, using firearms and dressed in
camouflage clothing, murdered more than 50 residents of these settlements. …
The investigation could find no confirmation of participation by the armed
forces in the aforementioned events. “
21.
On 17 January 2003, the Russian
authorities provided the following information on the “current results of
the investigations concerning the alleged massacres of civilians”: “On
March 5, 2000 criminal case (No. 12011) was instigated on the fact of
execution (shooting) of the civilians in Novy Aldy in Grozny. More than 100
witnesses were interrogated. Medical expertise was carried out. On April 15,
2002 preliminary investigation was suspended because the persons who had
committed the crime were not identified. At present the investigation of the
case was resumed and is under investigation.” However, I have at my disposal
a letter from the military prosecutor’s office in which it states that
Russian riot troops conducted a sweep operation in Novye Aldi on the day of
the massacre.
22.
Five members of the Estamirov family were among those killed that day. With
the help of the NGO “Chechnya Justice Initiative” (CJI), their relatives
have filed an application with the European Court of Human Rights. The case is
currently awaiting communication. According to this application, the
investigation of the Estamirov case was badly flawed. Russian law enforcement
agencies did not take any investigative steps immediately after receiving the
complaint (dated 22 February 2000), and first visited the crime scene on 8
April 2000. Although the bodies were exhumed, no full forensic examinations
were carried out, and no physical evidence collected at the scene of the
crime.
Mesker-Yurt
23.
From 21 May to 11 June 2002, long after
the large-scale military operations in the Chechen Republic were meant to have
ended, a “sweep” was organised by Russian forces the village of
Mesker-Yurt. The Russian NGO “Memorial” has written a report about this
incident[16], according to which
at least 12 residents of the village were killed by the Russian forces, with
another 10 having “disappeared” after being taken into custody on 30 May
2002, and another 10 suffering the same fate in the first days of June
2002.
24.
Russian Duma Deputy Aslanbek Aslakhanov
managed to visit the village on 8 June 2002, and is credited by the NGO with
saving a number of persons from illegal detention and torture. I have no
information at my disposal concerning a possible prosecutorial investigation
into these events.
Mass graves
25.
Several mass graves have been uncovered
in the Chechen Republic in the last three years. The biggest was found in
Zdorovye/Dachny, an area just outside the Russian military base in Khankala on
24 February 2002, which contained 51 corpses. But smaller mass graves have
been found regularly, such as a mass grave of 15 corpses near the border to
Ingushetia found on 9 September 2002, and another mass grave of 10 corpses
discovered early January 2003 on the outskirts of Grozny. Individual corpses
have also often been found simply dumped by the roadside, or buried in shallow
graves in fields, such as that of Shamil Akhmadov, who was detained in 12
March 2001 during a sweep operation in Argun, “diappeared”, and whose
body, bearing signs of ill-treatment and summary execution, was found in May
2002 in a vacant lot on the outskirts of the village[17].
26.
The treatment of the mass grave in
Zdorovye/Dachny, however, became a sort of test case for the ability and
willingness of the Russian authorities to deal with the most serious human
rights abuses. In the view of all the NGOs who provided me with information on
this issue, the Russian authorities botched the investigation. In March 2001,
the then Special Representative of the President, Mr V. Kalamanov, carried out
a fact-finding mission to the site, after which technical and expert
assistance was offered through the Council of Europe experts working in his
office, notably by involving forensic experts. Mr Kalamanov refused. At about
the same time, the Prosecutor-General indicated that the Russian prosecuting
bodies did not need assistance.
27.
According to a report by the NGO “Human
Rights Watch” of May 2001[18],
“the Russian government’s investigation into the circumstances surrounding
the deaths of those found at the site has been wholly inadequate”. Russian
authorities failed to provide adequate time or information for identifying the
bodies (34 bodies that had not yet been identified were buried by the Russian
authorities without prior announcement on 10 March 2001), and failed to
preserve crucial evidence that might have led to the identification of those
responsible for the torture and execution-style killings of the more than
fifty persons found at the site.
28.
The NGO “Memorial” has gathered
details on the detention by federal forces and subsequent “disappearance”
of sixteen of the identified bodies. Nevertheless, federal and local Russian
authorities deny responsibility for the deaths of those found at the site and
instead blame the deaths on Chechen fighters and criminal gangs – despite
the fact that the mass dumping ground is adjacent to the Khankala Russian
military base and has been under Russian military control since December 1999,
long before the vast majority of the bodies were deposited there. I have not
been provided with any information on the current stage of the investigation
by the prosecuting authorities.
29.
The NGO “Chechnya Justice Initiative” (CJI) has filed applications with
the European Court of Human Rights on behalf of the relatives of several of
the people whose bodies were identified from this mass grave. For example, on
3 June 2000, armed masked men on an armoured personnel carrier detained Nura
Lulueva, her cousins and several other people at the Northern market of
Grozny, where they had been selling strawberries. Lulueva’s body and those
of her cousins were among those retrieved from the mass grave in question. No
full forensic examination was conducted on Lulueva’s body, and physical
evidence, including clothing and blindfolds, was not saved for forensic
examination. Almost two years after the discovery of the body, the
investigation has led to no results. The case currently awaits communication[19].
Unlawful killings
30.
A high number of individual unlawful
killings have been reported by both human rights organisations and the press
over the last three years. However, it is often difficult to determine whether
Russian forces or Chechen fighters were responsible. I am thus only going to
briefly outline three cases of particular concern here, where I can be
reasonably sure that Russian forces are responsible.
31.
On 27 October 2001, Madina Mezhieva was
being driven home from a turnip field in Komsomolskoe by Amkhad Gekaev to
breastfeed her child. Russian military helicopters opened fire on their car.
Soldiers took them away alive, although injured, and then damaged the car in
an attempt to make it appear as if it had hit a landmine. Several days later,
the military commander’s office in Gudermes returned their dead bodies (both
missing limbs) to their families. Authorities failed to conduct full forensic
examinations of the bodies. Although the criminal investigation into the
killing was transferred to the military prosecutors’ office, indicating that
the preliminary investigation implicated servicemen, no suspects have been
named in the case, and the families were informed that no wrongdoing has been
found in the 27 October 2001 operation. The NGO “CJI” filed a preliminary
application with the European Court of Human Rights in April 2002 and will
submit the full application shortly.
32.
The NGO “Human Rights Watch” calls
the killing of Malika Umazheva on 29 November 2002 “the first clearly
retaliatory murder of its kind in Chechnya”[20].
Mrs Umazheva served as head of administration for Alkhan-Kala, a village on
the outskirts of Grozny. Unlike many other village administrators, she had
been very outspoken about abuses by Russian forces in her village, worked with
human rights organisations, and repeatedly confronted the Russian military
about them. According to eyewitnesses, soldiers in masks came to the Umazhev
home late in the evening and took Mrs Umazheva to the shed, where she was shot
in the back, in the heart, and in the head. Her family is convinced that
Russian forces are to blame, due to the fact she had received death threats
from Russian soldiers before, and that the soldiers who came to her house
spoke unaccented Russian, and fled in Russian military vehicles. The official
investigation into the case is reportedly continuing.
33.
Another shocking case is that of
Khadzhimurat Yandiev. Televison cameras shot footage of him after he was
detained (wounded) on 2 February 2000 at a hospital in Alkhan-Kala. On camera,
a Russian officer gives an order to his subordinates to shoot him. He was
never seen again. The television footage has been submitted to the prosecutor’s
office, which refused to open a criminal investigation into Yandiev’s
disappearance and has not identified the officer clearly visible on the
footage. Mrs Fatima Bazorkina, his mother, has filed an application with the
European Court of Human Rights with the help of the NGO “CJI”. The case is
currently awaiting communication.
Disappearances
34.
No-one really knows how many people have
“disappeared” in the Chechen Republic since the beginning of the current
conflict[21], even less so how
many have disappeared since the first conflict began in December 1994. The
numbers depend on how one defines a “disappearance” – thus, for example,
the Office of the Special Representative of the President of the Russian
Federation reportedly includes all missing persons (also those who have, for
example, left the Chechen Republic without informing their relatives, or those
who left home to gather firewood but stepped on a mine and whose bodies were
never found).
35.
In this report, I will use the
definition of the International Criminal Court, whose statute defines “enforced
disappearance of persons” as: “the arrest, detention or abduction of
persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or
a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of
those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time”.
36.
For the year 2002, the Russian NGO “Memorial”
has sent me a detailed list of 173 persons who were detained by
representatives of the Federal law-enforcement bodies and subsequently “disappeared”;
some of them were later found dead[22].
The list makes terrifying reading: people are detained during “sweep”-operations,
at checkpoints, or in their own homes, taken away by Russian law-enforcement
officials (often with armoured personnel carriers), never to be seen again
alive. Many have been subsequently found dead in mass graves or simply dumped
by the roadside. In response to a request by the OSCE Assistance Group in
Chechnya, the Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen Republic sent a list to the
group, detailing the investigative steps taken in a number of disappearances.
Regrettably, most cases were suspended within two months of being opened (the
minimum length of an investigation as required by law).
37.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to
detail each of these cases in the framework of this report[23],
so I will have to limit myself to two of the worst examples: From the very
beginning, the Assembly has been worried by the disappearance of the former
Speaker of the Chechen Parliament, Mr Alikhodzhiyev, on 17 May 2000. According
to information put at my disposal by the Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen
Republic on 16 January 2001[24],
“investigations in the case have established that on 17 May 2000 in the town
of Shali, unidentified persons, dressed in camouflage clothing and travelling
in an armoured troop carrier, burst into R. Sh. Alikhadzhiyev’s residence at
No. 97, Suvorova Street, Shali, and took him away to an unidentified
destination. … According to information from the head of the Shalinskiy
VOVD, Alikhadzhiyev was not arrested by employees of this service, nor has he
been held in the Shalinsky VOVD’s remand prison.” I have received no
update on the criminal investigation into this case since then.
38.
Another terrible case is that of Mr Said
Magomed Imakaev, an applicant to the European Court of Human Rights, and his
son. On 1 December 2000, Said-Khusein Imakayev was driving home from the
market when a group of armed men stopped his car and detained him. He
subsequently disappeared. The procuracy’s investigation into his
disappearance consisted of questioning two individuals and writing four
letters to law-enforcement authorities inquiring about his whereabouts.
When the letters failed to establish his whereabouts, the procuracy suspended
the investigation. Marzet Imakaeva and Said-Magomed Imakaev, Said-Khusein’s
parents, convinced that there was no commitment inside Russia to prosecuting
the guilty parties, filed an application with the European Court of Human
Rights in February 2002.
39.
Four months later, on 2 June 2002,
during a sweep operation in the Imakaev’s village of Novye Atagi, Russian
federal forces detained Said-Magomed Imakaev in his home. Despite concrete
evidence that could lead to the identity of the officer who detained Imakaev
(his wife was given a signed receipt for the confiscation of computer discs),
Russian authorities have denied detaining him and Marzet Imakaeva’s repeated
attempts to gain information about his whereabouts have been unsuccessful. The
“Chechnya Justice Initiative” filed an application on behalf of Marzet
Imakaeva in June 2002. The European Court entered into preliminary
correspondence with the Russian government about this case in June 2002, and
in September 2002 the Chechnya Justice Project filed a response to the
government’s first memorandum, which had asserted that the likely version of
events was that rebel fighters disguised as federal forces had detained
Said-Magomed Imakaev. The case currently awaits communication.
Torture and rape
40.
Torture and rape are two very serious
human rights violations which, NGOs allege, are common in the Chechen
Republic. However, it is extremely difficult to document them. Survivors of
torture are usually so frightened of reprisals that they do not complain about
their treatment in custody, especially not to the official authorities. Many
bodies found in Chechnya, do however, bear unmistakable signs of some of the
worst forms of torture, including the cutting off of ears, fingers and even
limbs. The Council of Europe’s own Committee for the Prevention of Torture
(CPT) has complained of Russia’s lack of co-operation with it. Russia has
yet to authorise the publication of its reports, which might be due to the CPT
having documented cases of torture during its numerous visits to the region.
41.
The
case of Alaudin Sadykov is one of the few cases of torture where the victim
has had the courage to lodge an official complaint. Police detained Alaudin
Sadykov on March 5, 2000, and kept him in the October district temporary
police precinct in Grozny for over two months. During those months, police cut
off one of his ears, broke several ribs and caused numerous other physical
injuries. Mr Sadykov was eventually released in May 2000.
42.
He reported the ill-treatment in June
2000 and actively corresponded with authorities, but the procuracy informed
him of launching a criminal investigation only in January of 2002.
Despite the fact that he knows the name and can recognise at least one of the
police officers who tortured him, and the fact that many fellow detainees and
guards were witness to the abuses, the investigation has failed to identify
suspects. The “Chechnya Justice Initiative” team filed an application to
the European Court of Human Rights on behalf of Mr Sadykov in July 2002. The
case is currently awaiting communication. Mr Sadykov described to Amnesty
International in detail instruments used to torture detainees, including ice
picks, hammers, surgical and dental instruments, instruments for removing
fingernails, spades and saws.
43.
Victims of rape are equally unlikely to
make official complaints, because Chechen society has strong taboos against
revealing instances of sexual assault. NGOs such as “Memorial” and “Human
Rights Watch” have nevertheless managed to document rapes, including gang
rapes, by Russian forces, for example during the “sweep” operation of 5
February 2000 in Novye Aldi (see above), of 3-4 July 2001 in Sernovodsk and of
4-5 July 2001 in Assinovskaia[25].
44.
One of the few rape (and murder) cases
to reach trial was that of Colonel Budanov. On 31 December 2002 he was
acquitted of murdering the young Chechen woman Elza Kungaeva on 26 March 2000
on the grounds of “temporary insanity”, although the prosecutor’s office
is reportedly appealing the verdict. The rape charge, however, was dropped by
the prosecution before the trial, although the forensic examination had found
that Kungaeva had endured anal and vaginal penetration just before her death.
Instead, one of Colonel Budanov’s subordinates was charged with “desecration
of a corpse”, but the investigation was closed under the 2000 amnesty.
Other human rights
violations
45.
Other human rights violations deserve a
quick mention here[26], although
they are too numerous to be described in detail – robbery, looting and
harassment are common allegations. Checkpoints remain notorious: not only are
bribes commonly necessary to pass them, but the Russian forces manning them
often harass passing civilians in addition, sometimes even detaining them for
no apparent reason. The Council of Europe experts working in the Office of the
Special Representative have reported that they were informed “that an order
issued by the military headquarters in Khankala requires that the security
clearance at a checkpoint should last between 15 and 30 minutes”[27].
Since checkpoints are so numerous in Chechnya (I counted 28 on a 40 km stretch
of road from Grozny to the Ingush border), travelling in Chechnya is thus not
only a hazardous, but also a very long procedure.
C.
Human rights abuses attributed to Chechen fighters
46.
Human rights abuses perpetrated by
Chechen fighters are notoriously hard to document. NGOs testify that it is
already difficult to persuade witnesses to testify when Russian forces are the
culprits, but that it is practically impossible to persuade those who
witnessed atrocities committed by Chechen fighters – the fear of reprisals
is too high. Thus, what I am presenting here might well be only the “tip of
the iceberg”.
47.
The latest information on criminal cases
instigated by the prosecutor’s office concerning crimes committed against
the civilian population in the Chechen Republic provided to the Assembly by
the Russian authorities on 17 January 2003 also contained information on the
crimes committed by “members of illegal armed formations”. In 2002, the
prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic instigated 311 criminal cases,
including 120 cases of crimes against law-enforcement officers, 81 cases of
crimes against heads of administrations, and 12 cases of crimes against the
clergy. Of these cases, 213 were suspended and 29 referred to court. These
numbers are very low, in particular if one takes into account that they are
most probably inflated by crimes which the prosecuting authorities attribute
to “unknown persons in camouflage uniform” who could just as well be
Russian servicemen as Chechen fighters.
Acts of mass terrorism
48.
The Assembly has always, and will always
condemn all terrorist acts in the harshest possible terms. While not on
Chechen territory, the hostage-taking in the Moscow theatre in the last days
of October 2002 by Chechen fighters was a terrible terrorist act that deserves
to be condemned in just such a way. Of course, the liberation of the hostages
by Russian special forces was not without its own problems: Over 117 hostages
died because of the first unspecified gas used in the operation, some of whom
might have been saved if they had been given more adequate medical attention.
49.
On 27 December 2002 a suicide bomb
attack targeted the building of the Chechen Administration and Government in
Grozny, claiming the lives of 82 persons and wounding 210 others. While,
according to the Russian Defence Minister, Mr Sergei Ivanov, those who
masterminded the attack have been identified, I have no other information on
the state of the investigation into this gruesome terrorist act.
Unlawful killings and
kidnappings
50.
Heads of local administration and
members of the prosecuting bodies continue to be the target of violent actions
carried out by Chechen fighters. Many pro-Moscow Chechens (and members of
their families) have been brutally murdered, others kidnapped, never to be
seen again. Recently, the heads of administration of the Tsotsin-Yurt village
(Kurchaloy district) and of the Sharoy district were killed by unknown
assailants, while the deputy prosecutors of the Shali and Shatoy districts
were abducted. According to the latest figures from the
Chechen Prosecutor's Office, 94 officials from local administrations died
since October 1999, 139 were injured and 34 kidnapped. 139 Chechen policemen
were killed, 149 were wounded and 29 are registered as missing. In the last
months of 2002, Chechen fighters are believed to be responsible for seven
assassinations, several assassination attempts, and nine abductions since 15
November 2002[28].
51.
It is often very difficult to determine
whether renegade Russian forces or Chechen fighters, or even criminal gangs
are responsible for the myriad kidnappings in Chechnya and neighbouring
Republics. In cases where heads of administrations and prosecutors are the
victims, however, a pattern is discernible that points in the direction of
Chechen fighters.
52.
One case of particular concern is that
of Mr Arjan Erkel, the 32-year-old Head of Mission for the Swiss section of
the NGO “Médecins Sans Frontičres (MSF)” in the Northern Caucasus. He
was abducted by three unknown gunmen on 12 August 2002 in Makhatchkala, the
capital of the Federal Republic of Dagestan. After more than five months of
focused efforts at many levels, MSF has not yet received any concrete
information about Mr Erkel’s fate, his whereabouts, or as to why and by whom
he was abducted. This has led MSF to conclude that his abduction might be
politically motivated. The relevant authorities in the Russian Federation
should give a higher political priority to assuring the safe release of Mr
Erkel, since such kidnappings further hamper the humanitarian aid effort in
the North Caucasus to the detriment of the suffering population.
D.
Conclusions
53.
The conclusions to be drawn from the
above-mentioned cases are depressingly clear: For nearly a decade now, people
in the Chechen Republic have lived in constant fear. Fear of the Russian
forces, fear of the Chechen fighters. A brief chronology of the events since 1
December 1994 can be described as follows: First, the population of the
Chechen Republic (especially in Grozny) had to endure carpet-bombing by
Russian forces, which cost upward from 20.000 lives[29].
Hot on the heels of the indiscriminate bombardment came a campaign of mindless
terror perpetrated by some of these Russian forces, with murder, rape,
torture, looting, pillaging and extortion being the order of the day[30].
54.
Then the Chechens must have felt
betrayed by their own people, losing confidence in a government that could not
or would not protect them from bands of religious extremists and criminal
gangs, who in turn held the Republic hostage by means of kidnapping, drug
smuggling and other violent acts. Vicious punishments were meted out in a
perversion of justice under Sharia-law. But the “liberation” of Chechnya
in the form of the second Russian campaign brought no relief: ruthless Russian
forces, more often than not, seem to make no difference between fighters and
civilians[31]. To this day, the
civilian population in the Republic risks illegal detention, unlawful “disappearance”,
even rape, torture and murder at the hands of some Russian forces, while not
being protected from kidnapping, murder and terrorist acts perpetrated by some
Chechen fighters.
55.
The reaction of the Russian authorities
has not been very constructive. One does get the feeling that the Russian
authorities are doing everything to hide the real situation in Chechnya from
public view. The Chechen Republic has practically been closed off – there is
nearly no access for journalists and NGOs.
56.
As I already clearly stated in my last
report of January 2003 (Doc. No. 9688), after a certain number of years, to be
told that a criminal case is still under investigation with no tangible
results, leads me to the following conclusion: The prosecuting bodies are
either unwilling or unable (or are being systematically obstructed in their
efforts) to find and bring to justice the responsible parties. Personally, by
now, I suspect that all three factors play a role in the ineffectiveness of
the prosecution when the crimes in question are those committed against
Chechen civilians. Thus, the recommendation of the Commissioner for Human
Rights, Mr Gil-Robles, following his recent visit to Chechnya, that more means
have to be put at the disposal of the prosecutor’s office, can only be a
partial solution, if at all.
57.
I would also like to refer to the
case-law of the European Commission of Human Rights in this respect, which has
ruled in the past that inquiries into a violation of a fundamental right (such
as the right to life or the prohibition of torture) that had not concluded for
two years after the alleged crime occurred and for which the authorities had
not provided an explanation as to the cause for the delay, could not be
considered as effective[32].
58.
Non-judicial redress mechanisms set up
by the Russian authorities, such as the Office of the Special Representative
of the President of the Russian Federation on Human Rights and Freedoms in the
Chechen Republic, do little more than catalogue individual complaints. While
the Assembly should pay tribute to the courage of the Council of Europe
experts working within that Office, there are questions regarding the
effectiveness of their current mandate. Measures should be taken to increase
their possibility of influencing the human rights situation in the Chechen
Republic.
59.
The mandate of the OSCE Assistance Group
to Chechnya has not been renewed by the Russian government. The
recommendations of the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights are
implemented by Russia with long delays, if at all. For example, his excellent
and necessary recommendations made in May 2002 “on certain rights that must
be guaranteed during the arrest and detention of persons following “cleansing”
operations in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation” were only
beginning to be implemented during his visit to the region in February 2003.
60.
The Council of Europe’s
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) has complained of Russia’s
lack of co-operation with it. It issued a public statement on 10 July
2001 (available from the Secretariat), prompted by the Russian authorities’
failure to cooperate with the CPT in relation to two issues: i) the carrying
out of a thorough and independent inquiry into events in a detention facility
at Chernokozovo during the period December 1999 to early February 2000; ii)
action taken to uncover and prosecute cases of ill-treatment of persons
deprived of their liberty in the Chechen Republic in the course of the current
conflict. The reports of its visits are still confidential, as the Russian
authorities have not authorised their publication.
61.
The European Court of Human Rights, set up to deal with
individual violations of human rights, cannot hope to cope effectively with
systematic human rights abuse of the Chechen scale via individual complaints.
Lamentably, no member state or group of member states has yet found the
courage to lodge an interstate complaint with the Court.
62.
The result is a climate of impunity
which encourages further human rights violations by both sides, and which
denies justice to the thousands of victims, embittering the population to a
point where the Chechen Republic could truly become ungovernable. The current
human rights situation in the Chechen Republic is unacceptable. If a
meaningful political process is to develop in the Republic, human rights
violations must stop, and those guilty of past abuses must be brought to
justice. The people of the Chechen Republic have a right not just to our pity,
but also to our protection.
63.
Of course, this will not be possible
without the active co-operation of the Russian authorities. Our Russian Duma
colleague and respected human rights activist Sergei Kovalev alleged last week
that Russian “death squads” operated in Chechnya[33].
He suggested that these “death squads” responsible for the kidnappings and
murders of Chechen civilians must be centrally organised by the federal forces
as a “coordinated general policy”. He based his assertion on the fact that
mass graves contained bodies of people detained at different times and places
in different parts of Chechnya – if these atrocities were committed by
soldiers who got out of hand, the corpses would be from one area and near
those troops.
64.
I cannot dismiss Mr Kovalev’s
allegations out of hand, but I do hope that he is wrong. However, he is right
in that the protection of the civilian population in the Chechen Republic, and
the prosecution of human rights abuses committed there, can no longer be left
to Russia alone, in view of its past failures. If Russia is not willing or
able to fulfil its obligations, the international community must step in.
65.
The international community can act in
two mutually reinforcing ways. First, member states of the
Council of Europe could pursue all avenues of accountability with regard to
the Russian Federation, including interstate complaints before the European
Court of Human Rights and the exercise of universal jurisdiction for the most
serious crimes committed in the Chechen Republic. Second, if the
efforts to bring to justice those responsible for human rights abuses are not
intensified, and the climate of impunity in the Chechen Republic prevails, the
international community could consider setting up an ad hoc tribunal to
try war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Chechen Republic, to be
empowered to try all such crimes committed in the Chechen Republic. It is
unrealistic to believe, of course, that such a tribunal could be set up
without the consent of the Russian Federation, either by the UN Security
Council or by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Without
Russia’s active co-operation, crimes in the Chechen Republic will continue
to go unpunished.
E.
Recommendations
66.
I have decided to only make
recommendations which are precise, detailed and constructive. I think the
Assembly should make the following recommendations:
67.
To ensure that human rights are
respected in the Chechen Republic in the future, the Assembly should recommend
that:
i.
Chechen fighters should immediately stop their terrorist activities and
renounce all forms of crime. Any kind of support for Chechen fighters should
cease immediately;
ii.
Russian forces be better controlled, and discipline enforced: all relevant
military and civilian regulations, constitutional guarantees and
international and humanitarian law, particularly the Geneva Conventions and
the protocols thereto, should be fully respected during all operations,
including full co-operation with the prokuratura before, during and
after such operations;
iii.
in so far as the security situation allows, troops should be confined to
their barracks or withdrawn from the Chechen Republic altogether;
iv.
those members of Russian forces suspected of committing abuses be fully
investigated and, if found guilty, severely punished in accordance with the
law, regardless of their rank and position;
v.
the recommendations of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights
should be implemented immediately by the Russian Federation.
68.
To ensure that those responsible for
abuses be brought to justice, the Assembly should:
i.
demand better co-operation from the Russian authorities with national and
international mechanisms of redress, both judicial and non-judicial;
ii.
call on member states of the Council of Europe to pursue all avenues of
accountability with regard to the Russian Federation without further delay,
including interstate complaints before the European Court of Human Rights
and the exercise of universal jurisdiction for the most serious crimes
committed in the Chechen Republic;
iii.
consider that, if the efforts to bring to justice those responsible for
human rights abuses are not intensified, and the climate of impunity in the
Chechen Republic prevails, the international community should consider
setting up an ad hoc tribunal to try war crimes and crimes against
humanity in the Chechen Republic, to be empowered to try all such crimes
committed in the Chechen Republic;
iv.
urge Russia to ratify the Statute of the International Criminal Court
without delay.
69.
In addition, the Assembly should make
the following recommendations to the Committee of Ministers:
i.
reorient its assistance programmes in the North Caucasus towards an
amelioration of the human rights situation in the Chechen Republic as the
priority objective, and allocate sufficient funds to these programmes to
make a real difference;
ii.
ensure that non-governmental organisations active in preventing and
documenting human rights violations in the Chechen Republic, as well as
those assisting their victims in different ways, are involved in said
assistance programmes;
iii.
urge the Russian government to fully comply with the recommendations
addressed to it in paragraphs 9 and 10 of Resolution No. … (2003) on the
human rights situation in the Chechen Republic;
iv.
if the efforts to bring to justice those guilty of human rights abuses are
not intensified, and the climate of impunity in the Chechen Republic
prevails, consider proposing to the international community the setting up
of an ad hoc tribunal to try war crimes and crimes against humanity
in the Chechen Republic, to be empowered to try all such crimes committed in
the Chechen Republic.
Reporting
committee: Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights
Reference
to committee: Order
584 (2003)
Draft
resolution adopted with 30
votes in favour, 1 vote againstand 2 abstentions,
draft recommendation adopted
with 31 votes in favour, 1 vote against and 2 abstentions and draft order adopted
unanimously, by the Committee on 3 March 2003
Members
of the Committee: Mr Lintner (Chairperson),
Mr Marty, Mr Jaskiernia, Mr Jurgens (Vice-Chairpersons),
Mrs Ahlqvist, Mr Akçam, Mr G. Aliyev (alternate: Mr R. Huseynov), Mrs
Arifi, Mr Arzilli, Mr Attard
Montalto, Mr Barquero
Vázquez, Mr
Berisha, Mr Bindig, Mr
Brecj, Mr Bruce, Mr Chaklein, Mrs Christmas-Mřller (alternate:
Mrs Auken), Mr Cilevics, Clerfayt, Mr Contestabile,
Mr Daly, Mr Davis, Mr Dees (alternate: Mr Janssen van Raaij),
Mr Dimas, Mrs Domingues, Mr Engeset, Mrs Err, Mr Fedorov, Mr Fico,
Mrs Frimansdóttir, Mr Frunda, Mr Galchenko (alternate: Mr Shishlov),
Mr Guardans, Mr Gündüz, Mrs Hajiyeva, Mrs Hakl, Mr Holovaty
(alternate: Mr Shybko), Mr Jansson, Mr Kelber, Mr Kelemen (alternate:
Mr Németh), Mr Kontogiannopoulos, Mr S. Kovalev, Mr Kroll,
Mr Kroupa, Mr Kucheida, Mrs Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Mr Livaneli, Mr Manzella,
Mr Martins, Mr Mas Torres, Mr Masson (alternate: Mr Hunault), Mr McNamara,
Mr Meelak, Mrs Nabholz-Haidegger, Mr Nachbar, Mr Olteanu, Mrs
Pasternak, Mr Pehrson, Mr Pellicini (alternate: Mr Ianuzzi), Mr
Pentchev (alternate: Mr Arabajdiev), Mr Piscitello, Mr
Poroshenko, Mrs Postoica, Mr Pourgourides, Mr Raguz, Mr Ransdorf,
Mr Rochebloine, Mr Rustamyan, Mr Skrabalo, Mr Solé Tura (alternate:
Mrs Lopez Gonzales), Mr Spindelegger, Mr Stankevic (alternate: Mr Lydeka),
Mr Stoica (alternate: Mr Coifan) Mr Symonenko, Mr Tabajdi, Mrs
Tevdoradze, Mr Toshev, Mr Vanoost, Mr Wilkinson, Mrs Wohlwend
N.B.
The names of those members who were present at the meeting are printed in
italics.
Secretaries
to the Committee: Ms Coin, Mr
Schirmer, Ms Kleinsorge, Mr Ćupina, Mr Milner
On 17 February 2003, the Secretary General of the Assembly, Mr Haller, wrote
letters to MM. Sultygov and Rogozin requesting such information.
i.e. “an updated and detailed list of all criminal
investigations by military and civilian law enforcement agencies into crimes
against the civilian population by servicemen and members of all police and
special forces and also into crimes committed by Chechen fighters against the
civilian population, the local Chechen administration and the federal forces
in the Chechen Republic. In addition to statistical data, this list should
contain details of the nature of the crimes committed and the current status
of the investigation and/or indictments and convictions”.
For example, relatives still mourn the dead of the massacre of Samashki
perpetrated by Russian forces in April 1995, as well as hundreds of people
kidnapped in the last decade by Chechen fighters, never to be seen again.
Reproduced as Appendix III of Assembly Doc 9687.
An article by AFP of 10 January 2003 does, however, cite the Chief Military
Prosecutor, Mr Alexander Savenkov, as giving the following numbers: Since
October 1999, 46 federal servicemen have been sentenced by military courts, 11
of them for murder and 13 of them for rape. It is not clear, however, whether
these sentences concern exclusively crimes committed against civilians.
See “Accountability for violations of human rights committed in Chechnya –
Charts and Graphs”, Human Rights Watch, 18 January 2002.
Appendix I, “Twenty-fifth interim report by the Secretary General on the
presence of the Council of Europe’s experts in the Office of the Special
Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for ensuring Human
Rights and Civil Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic”, 24 January
2003, SG/Inf (2003) 2.
Decree No. 80 of 27 March 2002 of the Command of the United Group of Forces in
the Northern Caucasus Region of the Russian Federation, on Measures to Enhance
Efforts by Local Government Authorities and Law Enforcement Agencies of the
Russian Federation in the Fight Against Unlawful Actions and Accountability
for Officials for Violations of Law and Law and Order in the Conduct of
Special Operations and Targeted Operations in Settlements in the Chechen
Republic.
“No happiness remains”, Human Rights Watch, April 2000.
“Civilian killings in Staropromyslovski district of Grozny”, Human Rights
Watch, February 2000.
Decision cited in the response of Applicants Khashiev M.A. (Applicant
57942/00) and Akaeva R.A. (Applicant 57945/00) to Observations of the
Representative of the Russian Federation in the European Court of Human Rights
to the European Court of Human Rights, put at my disposal by NGOs.
Appendix to Assembly Doc. 8948.
This response is puzzling for two reasons. First, why did the prosecutor’s
office not open an investigation when the victims reported the killings to
them, two months before the article appeared in the newspaper? Second, why did
the prosecutor’s office claim that there were no eyewitnesses to the
murders, when, in its report, Human Rights Watch cites the testimony of two
women who were themselves shot during the killings but survived?
“February 5: A day of slaughter in Novye Aldi”, Human Rights Watch, June
2000.
Appendix to Assembly Doc. 8948.
“Zachistka v selye Meker-Yurt”, Memorial, 18 July 2002.
The NGO “Chechnya Justice Initiative” (CJI) filed a preliminary
application with the European Court of Human Rights on behalf of Tamusa
Akhmadova, Akhmadov’s mother, in October 2002.
“Burying the Evidence: the botched investigation into a mass grave in
Chechnya”, Human Rights Watch, May 2001.
CJI
also filed applications with the European Court on behalf of relatives of
three other men, Magomed Magomadov, Said-Rakhman Musaev, and Odes Mitaev,
whose bodies werefound inthe mass grave. In these cases as well, physical
evidence was not preserved for forensic examination.
“Into harm’s way”: Forced return of displaced people to Chechnya”,
Human Rights Watch, January 2003.
The French newspaper “Le Figaro” put the number of disappeared persons
since October 1999 at 2.800 in an article of 21 February 2003.
List available upon request from the Secretariat of the Committee (Russian
only).
For more examples, see inter alia “Last seen: continued “disappearances”
in Chechnya”, Human Rights Watch, April 2002.
Appendix to Assembly Doc. 8948.
“Swept under”, Human Rights Watch, February 2002.
I will, however, not deal with the question of forcible return of IDPs here,
since this is within the mandate of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and
Demography.
“Twenty-fifth interim report by the Secretary General on the presence of the
Council of Europe’s experts in the Office of the Special Representative of
the President of the Russian Federation for ensuring Human Rights and Civil
Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic”, 24 January 2003, SG/Inf (2003)
2.
“Into Harm’s Way”, Human Rights Watch, January 2003.
A team led by our colleague, Duma Deputy Sergei Kovalev, puts the number of
civilian casualties in the first conflict at more than 50.000.
See the resolutions, recommendations, reports and opinions discussed in the
Assembly from 1995 to 1996.
For example, in an interview published in the Russian newspaper Novaya
gazata on June 19, 2000, General Shamanov stated that his image as a “cruel
general” is a compliment for him. In the same interview he stated that the
wives and children of rebel fighters in his opinion are also “bandits”
that need to be destroyed.
See, for example, Timurtas v. Turkey, Sarli v. Turkey, and Tanli v. Turkey.
The Jamestown Foundation, Chechnya Weekly, 20 February 2003.
Source: PACE
(A/T)
